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1. Introduction
The economic analysis of rank-order tournaments presents
itself today as a tremendously successful research area that has
experienced a steady increase in interest since its very beginnings.1
On the theoretical front, it has often been crucial to characterize the
optimal tournament (Lazear andRosen, 1981;Nalebuff and Stiglitz,
1983; Akerlof and Holden, 2012). This task has most commonly
been accomplished using the so-called first-order approach, i.e., by
replacing a continuum of incentive compatibility conditions in
the firm’s design problem with a single marginal condition.
However, the first-order approach is not generally valid, and as
a consequence, the properties of the optimal tournament have
sometimes been discussed under somewhat restrictive or even
indistinct conditions.2
In this paper, an alternative route to the analysis of optimal
rank-order tournaments is taken. The approach entails the con-
struction of an ‘‘upper envelope’’ over all incentive compatibility
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1 See, e.g., the evidence provided by Connelly et al. (2014). For an introduction to
the economics of tournaments, see Mookherjee (1990) or Prendergast (1999, Sec.
2.3).
2 Useful discussions of the scope and limitations of the first-order approach in
tournament theory can be found in McLaughlin (1988) and Gürtler (2011).
conditions, which is then added as an inequality constraint to the
relaxed problem. Thereby, the optimal tournament may be char-
acterized as the solution of an optimization problem with a finite
number of constraints. Of course, the thereby reformulated prob-
lem remains difficult. However, in contrast to the original prob-
lem, techniques fromMilgrom and Segal (2002) may be applied to
derive key properties of the optimal tournament even if the first-
order approach is invalid or difficult to justify.
The main result of this paper says that the first-order approach
to tournament design is not innocuous. Specifically, it is found
that traditional conclusions regarding the efficiency of rank-
order tournaments are not universally valid and sometimes too
optimistic. In fact, tournaments may be substantially less efficient
than suggested by the existing literature.3 Further, with additional
structure imposed on the cost and utility functions, the optimal
tournamentmay be characterized in explicit terms even if the first-
order approach is invalid. The paper also considers an extension
to tournaments with many contestants and a single winner, which
may be seen as an equilibrium analysis complementing priorwork.
The observation that the first-order approach is not generally
valid in a moral hazard setting is due to Mirrlees (1975). Subse-
quent research on the first-order approachmay be roughly divided
into two strands. A first strand of the literature is concerned
with formulating sufficient conditions for the first-order ap-
proach (Rogerson, 1985; Jewitt, 1988; Sinclair-Desgagné, 1994;
Conlon, 2009; Ke, 2013; Kirkegaard, 2014a). A second strand of
3 The present paper deals exclusively with the incentive side of rank-order
tournaments. The selection efficiency of tournaments has been studied by Clark and
Riis (2001), Hvide and Kristiansen (2003), and Münster (2007), for instance.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.004
0304-4068/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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the literature has aimed at eliminating restrictive assumptions
from the standard model of moral hazard (Grossman and Hart,
1983; Mirrlees, 1986; Araujo and Moreira, 2001; Ke, 2012; Kadan
and Swinkels, 2013; Kirkegaard, 2014b; Renner and Schmedders,
2015). The present paper differentiates itself from these contribu-
tions already by its focus on rank-order tournaments. However,
also the approach is different. For example, the present paper does
not employ a Lagrangian function. Some implications of this point
will be discussed in the conclusion.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
introduces the set-up, and discusses existence. The envelope
approach is developed in Section 3. A characterization of the
optimal tournament is presented in Section 4, and discussed in
Section 5. An extension with more than two contestants is offered
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. All proofs have been relegated to
an Appendix.
2. Set-up and existence
Consider amarket environment inwhich risk-neutral firms hire
workers to produce output of per-unit value V > 0. Given a wage
W and an effort level µ ≥ 0, a worker’s utility is defined as
U(W )−C(µ), whereU is twice differentiablewithU ′ > 0,U ′′ ≤ 0,
and C is four times differentiable with C ′ ≥ 0, C ′′ > 0, C ′(0) = 0,
and C ′(µ) → ∞ as µ → ∞.4 Worker j’s output (j = 1, 2) is the
sum of his effortµj and a random component εj, i.e., qj = µj+εj. It
will be assumed that the distribution function G of the differential
error term ξ ≡ ε2− ε1 is symmetric with respect to the origin and
allows a twice differentiable density g = G′ > 0 such that g ′ and
g ′′ are bounded. Given a pair of prizes (W1,W2) with W1 ≥ W2,
worker j’s expected utility from playing µj against µk, with k ≠ j,
is then given as
U(W1)prob[qj > qk] + U(W2)(1− prob[qj > qk])− C(µj)
= U(W2)+ (U(W1)− U(W2))G(µj − µk)− C(µj). (1)
In the usual dual formulation, firms choose prizes and an effort
level so as to maximize a worker’s expected utility subject to zero-
profit and incentive compatibility conditions:
max
W1≥W2
µ≥0
U(W1)+ U(W2)
2
− C(µ) (2)
s.t.
µV = W1 +W2
2
(3)
(U(W1)− U(W2))G(µ− µ)− C(µ)
≤ (U(W1)− U(W2))G(0)− C(µ) (µ ≥ 0) (4)
Problem (2)–(4) will be called the unrelaxed problem. A solution
(W ∗1 ,W
∗
2 , µ
∗) to the unrelaxed problem will be referred to
(somewhat loosely) as an optimal tournament associated with G.
Under the first-order approach (FOA), the continuum of in-
centive compatibility conditions in (4) is replaced by the single
marginal condition
g(0)(U(W1)− U(W2)) = C ′(µ). (5)
4 The additively separable form of the utility function ensures tractability (cf.
Green and Stokey, 1983; Krishna andMorgan, 1998; and Akerlof andHolden, 2012).
As discussed in McLaughlin (1988), alternative specifications of the worker’s utility
function tend to produce similar conclusions under the first-order approach. It
is conjectured that the same is true for the additional settings considered in the
present paper.
Condition (5) is necessary for any solution of the unrelaxed
problem.5 We will refer to the maximization problem (2), subject
to constraints (3) and (5), as the relaxed problem.
The relaxed problem is known to allow a solution (W FOA1 ,W
FOA
2 ,
µFOA) that can be approximated by replacing utility and cost func-
tionswith their respective second-order Taylor expansions. For ex-
ample, the effort level and the prize spread may be approximated
by
C ′(µFOA) ≈ V
1+ sC ′′/4g(0)2 (6)
and
W FOA1 −W FOA2 ≈
g(0)V
g(0)2 + sC ′′/4 , (7)
respectively, where s = −U ′′/U ′ denotes the worker’s Arrow–
Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and marginal utility is
normalized to unity at mean income.6 Moreover, if the worker’s
expected utility function
UFOA(µ) = U(W FOA2 )+ G(µ− µFOA)
× (U(W FOA1 )− U(W FOA2 ))− C(µ) (8)
is, say, strictly concave, then (W FOA1 ,W
FOA
2 , µ
FOA) solves also
the unrelaxed program. In particular, in the risk-neutral case,
C ′(µFOA) = V , and the resulting allocation of resources is efficient.
When UFOA is not strictly concave, however, then there is no
guarantee that all the incentive compatibility conditions in (4)
hold, i.e., the effort level µFOA may be merely a local maximum of
UFOA.7 In other words,µFOA need not be a symmetric pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in the tournament with prizes (W FOA1 ,W
FOA
2 ).
In that case, (W FOA1 ,W
FOA
2 , µ
FOA) will not be a solution of the
unrelaxed problem, which illustrates the limits of the first-order
approach. In the present paper, the first-order approach will be
called invalid if, for every solution of the relaxed problem, there
is at least one incentive compatibility condition in (4) that fails to
hold true.8
As pointed out by Green and Stokey (1983), the potential non-
existence of a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a
tournament with arbitrary prizes does not impair the firm’s ability
to design the contract (W1,W2, µ) in such a way that µ is a
symmetric pure-strategyNash equilibrium in the tournamentwith
prizes (W1,W2).9 In fact, as shown in the Appendix, this design
problem can always be solved in an optimal way.
5 This is obvious if the optimum effort choice is interior, i.e., if µ∗ > 0. If,
however, µ∗ = 0, then the Inada conditions imposed on the cost function imply
thatW ∗1 = W ∗2 , so that (5) is satisfied also in that case.
6 The specific expressions in (6) and (7) are taken fromMcLaughlin (1988, p. 231).
These expressions are most accurate when g(0) is large, so that the second-order
Taylor approximations are accurate, and when s is small, so that the normalization
of marginal utility matters least. When these conditions are not satisfied, however,
it is preferable to solve the relaxed problem numerically, as done below.
7 Indeed, µFOA may fail to be a global maximum of UFOA even if the second-order
condition holds strictly atµFOA (as it does under the present assumptions), and even
if a deviation to a zero effort level is unprofitable for the worker.
8 Thus, the first-order approach is valid in the terminology of the present paper if
some solution (W FOA1 ,W
FOA
2 , µ
FOA) of the relaxed problem satisfies all the incentive
compatibility conditions in (4). It will be noted that the definition for validity used
in the present paper is slightly less demanding than the one employed by Rogerson
(1985, p. 1363), who required for validity that any solution of the relaxed problem
should satisfy incentive compatibility. However, the two definitions coincide when
the relaxed problem has a unique solution, such as in the risk-neutral case or in the
cases considered in Sections 4 and 5.
9 See Green and Stokey (1983, fn. 3): ‘‘For arbitrary prize structures, there may
be no Nash equilibrium, symmetric or otherwise. This is of no importance to us,
since we are considering only tournaments that are designed so that they do have a
symmetric Nash equilibrium (emphasis in the original)’’.
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Proposition 1. An optimal tournament exists (i.e., even if the first-
order approach is invalid).
The proposition raises the question of how the optimal tournament
looks like in settings not traditionally considered. This question is
addressed in the following sections.10
3. Side-stepping the first-order approach
This section describes the envelope approach to rank-order
tournaments that has been outlined in the Introduction. Note first
that one may add the equality constraint
U(W1)− U(W2) = ∆(µ) ≡ C
′(µ)
g(0)
(9)
to the unrelaxed problem (2)–(4) without affecting the solution.
Provided that (9) holds, however, incentive compatibility (4)
becomes equivalent to
∆(µ)(G(µ− µ)− G(0))+ C(µ)− C(µ) ≤ 0 (µ ≥ 0). (10)
Consider now the ‘‘upper envelope’’ of the individual constraints
in (10), i.e.,
ϕ(µ) = maxµ≥0 {(G(µ− µ)− G(0))∆(µ)+ C(µ)− C(µ)} , (11)
where themaximum is attained as a consequence of the Inada con-
ditions. The unrelaxed problem (2)–(4) may then be reformulated
as
max
µ≥0
U(µ) (12)
s.t. ϕ(µ) ≤ 0, (13)
where U(µ) denotes the value of the firm’s objective function
(2) under the condition that the prize structure (W1,W2) is de-
fined implicitly through (3) and (5).11 The reformulated prob-
lem (12)–(13) is still not standard, because ϕ may have kinks.
However, using the tools provided by Milgrom and Segal (2002),
it can be shown that ϕ is monotone increasing if marginal costs are
logconcave.12Moreover, sinceϕ(0) = 0,monotonicity implies that
the feasible set in the reformulated problem (12)–(13) is a closed
interval whose left endpoint is zero. Hence, the following result is
obtained.
Proposition 2. Assume that C ′ is logconcave, and that the first-order
approach is invalid. Then µ∗ < µFOA for any pair of respective
solutions of the unrelaxed and the relaxed problems.
10 The restriction to tournaments that allow a symmetric pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium is definitely a choice we made. Alternatively, one could have assumed
that firmsmay choose to implementmixed-strategyNash equilibria. Unfortunately,
the literature offers little guidance with regard to this point. For example, while
Green and Stokey (1983) consider only pure-strategy equilibria, Nalebuff and
Stiglitz (1983) find it more natural to allow for randomization. This point will be
taken up again in the conclusion.
11 It is not hard to check that U(µ) is well-defined for any µ ≥ 0. Indeed, using
(3) to eliminateW2 in (5), one obtains
U(W1)− U(2Vµ−W1) = C
′(µ)
g(0)
.
Differentiating the left-hand side with respect to W1 , and noting that U ′ > 0,
shows that there is at most one solution. Further, since U ′′ ≤ 0, the left-hand side
approaches±∞ asW1 →±∞. By continuity, there is a unique solution.
12 Being a rather mild assumption, logconcavity of marginal costs has been
imposed in prior work (e.g., Chan et al., 2009 and Akerlof and Holden, 2012), and
is consistent with both convex and concave marginal costs. Also, marginal costs
cannot be globally logconvex under the Inada conditions imposed. Still, it remains
an assumption, of course.
Proposition 2 shows that the first-order approach to tournament
design is not innocuous, in the sense that it has the potential to
cause a bias in the level of effort considered to be implementable.
For intuition, suppose that (W FOA1 ,W
FOA
2 , µ
FOA) is a solution of
the relaxed problem, yet that the first-order approach is invalid.
Then, µFOA is not a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
the tournament defined through prizes (W FOA1 ,W
FOA
2 ).
13 In other
words, there necessarily exists an effort level µFOA ≠ µFOA such
that UFOA(µFOA) > UFOA(µFOA), where UFOA is defined through
above Eq. (8).14 Without loss of generality, µFOA may be chosen to
be a global optimum of UFOA, so that ϕ(µFOA) = UFOA(µFOA) −
UFOA(µFOA) > 0. But if ϕ is monotone increasing, then the firm’s
only way to reduce the worker’s incentive to deviate is it to lower
the contractual level of effort relative to µFOA.
To understand why an assumption on costs is needed, note that
raising µ has altogether three effects on the envelope constraint
(13). First, C(µ) increases, which tightens the constraint. Second,
U(W1) − U(W2) increases, which loosens the constraint. Finally,
deviations become less likely to win, which also loosens (13).
However, if costs are not excessively convex then the change to
the prize structure remains sufficiently moderate compared to the
differential of the other two effects, tipping the balance in favor of
a tightening constraint.
The size of the potential welfare loss captured by Proposition 2
is not negligible. To the contrary, as will become clear below,
tournaments may be quite ineffective as an incentive device.15
4. An explicit characterization
This section presents a complete characterization of the optimal
tournament in a standard setting. Specifically, it will be assumed
that costs are quadratic, i.e., that C(µ) = cµ2/2 for some c > 0,
and that workers exhibit a constant absolute risk aversion, i.e., that
either U(W ) = −e−sW/s for s > 0 or U(W ) = W . These
assumptions are made for tractability and can be relaxed. Indeed,
as discussed below, the main features of the optimal tournament
do not depend on these assumptions.
To describe the equilibrium in cases where the first-order ap-
proach is not valid, it proves useful to take a comparative stat-
ics perspective with respect to the dispersion of the differential
error term. Thus, for a given distribution function G and an arbi-
trary parameter σ > 0, one defines a new distribution function
Gσ (z) ≡ G(z/σ), where a largerσ corresponds to amore dispersed
distribution of the differential error term. E.g., if G is standard nor-
mal, then Gσ is normal with mean zero and standard deviation σ .
It is shown in the Appendix (see Lemma A.2) that, under the
present assumptions, the firm’s indirect objective function U ≡
Uσ is strongly pseudoconcave in µ, i.e., that the strict second-
order condition for a local maximum holds at any critical point.
In particular, there is a unique optimal effort level µFOA(σ ) in the
relaxed problem associated with Gσ . As discussed in Section 2,
this solution may be approximated in the case of risk aversion,
and explicitly obtained in the case of risk neutrality. The optimal
tournament (W ∗1 (σ ),W
∗
2 (σ ), µ
∗(σ )) associatedwith Gσ may now
be characterized in terms of µFOA(σ ) as follows.
13 Indeed, if µFOA were a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the
tournament with prizes (W FOA1 ,W
FOA
2 ), then (W
FOA
1 ,W
FOA
2 , µ
FOA) would satisfy
incentive compatibility, and hence, would solve the unrelaxed problem, in conflict
with our presumption that the first-order approach is invalid.
14 Moreover, provided that g is unimodal, µFOA < µFOA , as intuition suggests.
15 To mitigate the welfare loss, firms might decide to use deliberately inaccurate
performancemeasures (O’Keeffe et al., 1984), or to inducemixed-strategy equilibria
(Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983, Appendix). Both options are excluded here, however.
4 C. Ewerhart / Journal of Mathematical Economics 63 (2016) 1–9
Fig. 1. The optimally implemented effort level.
Proposition 3. Suppose that costs are quadratic and that workers
have CARA utility (which includes the case of risk-neutrality as a limit
case). Then, there is a threshold valueσ ∗ > 0 such that, for anyσ > 0,
the optimal tournament associated with Gσ is unique and implements
the effort level
µ∗(σ ) = min
 σ
σ ∗
· µFOA(σ ∗), µFOA(σ )

. (14)
As the proposition shows, the optimal tournament will be shaped
by the envelope constraint (13) once the level of individual-specific
uncertainty falls below a certain level. In particular, the usual
comparative statics result that µFOA(σ ) is monotone decreasing in
σ ,16 is misleading about the comparative statics of µ∗. Instead, as
illustrated in Fig. 1, the optimally implemented effort level µ∗ =
µ∗(σ ) is strictly unimodal in the case of risk aversion. Similarly,
µ∗ is piecewise linear in the case of risk neutrality where µFOA is a
constant.
Denote by W FOA1 (σ ) and W
FOA
2 (σ ) the optimal prizes for the
relaxed problemassociatedwithGσ . Using the second-order Taylor
expansion of utility as above, the prize spread implementing the
optimal effort level can be shown to satisfy
W ∗1 (σ )−W ∗2 (σ ) ≈ min
 σ
σ ∗
, 1

· W FOA1 (σ )−W FOA2 (σ ) , (15)
where the approximation is exact for σ ≥ σ ∗, and fairly precise for
σ close to zero and s small.17 Thus, also the predicted prize spread
may be biased under the first-order approach. In particular, as σ
gets smaller, the optimal spread diminishes much faster than the
first-order approach would suggest.18
5. Discussion
To clarify what happens for σ < σ ∗, consider a worker’s
expected utility from exerting an effort of µ in the optimal
16 Cf. Lazear and Rosen (1981, p. 853) and McLaughlin (1988, fn. 5). Under the
specific assumptions of Proposition 3, the monotonicity of µFOA follows from
Lemma A.3 in the Appendix.
17 To see this, note that the necessary first-order condition (5) impliesW1−W2 ≈
cµσ/U ′g(0) for the respective solutions of the unrelaxed and the relaxed problems.
18 When the assumptions of Proposition 3 are relaxed, one can still show that
µ∗(σ ) = µFOA(σ ) for σ sufficiently large and that µ∗(σ ) → 0 as σ → 0. Thus,
even though the homogeneous relationships reflected in (14) and (15) tend to break
down for cost functions that donot exhibit a constant elasticity, the characterization
result captures, in its essence, a more general fact.
tournament associated with Gσ , i.e.,
U∗σ (µ) = U(W ∗2 (σ ))+ Gσ (µ− µ∗(σ ))
× (U(W ∗1 (σ ))− U(W ∗2 (σ )))− C(µ). (16)
Then, the following observation can be made.
Remark 1. For σ < σ ∗, there is a ‘‘cheating level’’µ∗(σ ) ≠ µ∗(σ )
such that U∗σ (µ∗(σ )) = U∗σ (µ∗(σ )).
Thus, whenever the envelope constraint matters, the worker’s
objective function U∗σ exhibits, besides its global maximum at
µ∗(σ ), at least one additional global maximum at some µ∗(σ ) ≠
µ∗(σ ). To see why this is so, suppose that there is no ‘‘cheating
level’’. Then, as intuition suggests, the firm could marginally
raise the contractual effort level above µ∗(σ ), and still satisfy
incentive compatibility.19 But, by strong pseudoconcavity, the
firm’s indirect utility function is strictly increasing at µ∗(σ ),
leading to a contradiction. Hence, the worker’s best-response set
indeed consists of at least two elements.20
For a general density g , there may be many ‘‘cheating
levels,’’ possibly infinitely many. For g sufficiently well-behaved,
however, it turns out that there is at most one global maximizer
of U∗σ other than µ∗(σ ). We will say that g is strictly bell-shaped if
there is an r > 0 such that g ′′(z) ≷ 0 if |z| ≷ r . The following
observation can now be made.
Remark 2. Suppose that g is strictly bell-shaped. Then, for any
σ ≤ σ ∗(s),
µ∗(σ ) = σγ g(0)
g(0)− g(γ ) , (17)
µ∗(σ ) = σγ g(γ )g(0)− g(γ ) , (18)
where γ is the unique strictly positive solution of the equation
g(0)+ g(γ )
2
= 1
γ
 γ
0
g(z)dz. (19)
19 Given that the worker’s local second-order condition holds strictly at µ∗(σ ),
this point turns out to be an immediate consequence of Berge’s Theorem.
20 The necessity of a ‘‘cheating level’’ may be familiar from Grossman and Hart
(1983, Prop. 6) or Mookherjee (1984, Prop. 1). There, the absence of a utility-
equivalent lower level of effort would allow the principal to implement the same
level of effort at lower cost. Here, similarly, even though actions are continuous, the
absence of a ‘‘cheating level’’ would allow the firm to implement a higher level of
effort.
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The two remarks above are illustrated by the following two
examples.
Example 1. For g standard normal, γ = 2.2809. Hence, µ∗(σ ) =
0.1827 · σ andµ∗(σ ) = 2.4636 · σ , for any σ ≤ σ ∗. For s = 0, this
implies µ∗(σ ) = min{2.4637 · σ ; V/c}, so that σ ∗ = 0.4059 ·
V/c. For s = 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 10, the relaxed problem was solved
numerically over the grid σ = 0.01, . . . , 1.00. On that sample,
σ ∗(s)was found to be strictly declining in s, which is intuitive.
Example 2. If ε1 and ε2 are uniformly distributed, then ξ follows
a triangular distribution (e.g., Bull et al., 1987; and Altmann et al.,
2012). The normalized density g(z) = max{0,min{1 + z, 1 − z}}
is, however, not strictly bell-shaped, so that Remark 2 does not
apply. Still, the conclusion of Proposition 3 holds. For instance, for
s = 0, one can check that ϕ(µ) ≡ ϕσ (µ) = cµ2 max{0, µ− σ }, so
that the optimal tournament associated with Gσ is characterized
by µ∗(σ ) = min{σ , V/c} andW ∗1/2(σ ) = (V ± cσ2 )µ∗(σ ).
Notably, the envelope constraint (13) may come into play in
response to changes in V , c , or s, i.e., even if the information
structure does not change. As discussed in the next section, an
increase in the number of contestants may have a similar effect.
6. Large tournaments
This section considers an extension to tournaments with more
than two contestants. Attention will be restricted to the case of a
single winner.
Denote by F and f the distribution and density functions
associated with an individual error term ε (assumed i.i.d. across
players). Considering a tournament between n workers, and
provided that all opponents of some given player j exert the same
effort levelµ, worker j’s probability ofwinningmay be represented
as
Gn(µj, µ) =
 +∞
−∞
F(µj + ε − µ)n−1dF(ε). (20)
The problem of the firm is only slightly modified:
max
W1≥W2
µ≥0
U(W1)+ (n− 1)U(W2)
n
− C(µ) (21)
s.t.
µV = W1 + (n− 1)W2
n
(22)
(U(W1)− U(W2))Gn(µ,µ)− C(µ)
≤ (U(W1)− U(W2))Gn(µ,µ)− C(µ) (µ ≥ 0) (23)
The optimal tournament satisfies, in particular, the necessary first-
order condition for a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium,
U(W1)− U(W2) = ∆n(µ) ≡ C
′(µ)
gn
, (24)
where
gn = (n− 1)
 +∞
−∞
F(ε)n−2f (ε)2dε. (25)
An approximation for the solution of the relaxed problem, µFOAn ,
can be found as before. However, as pointed out by McLaughlin
(1988, p. 241), it is in general very difficult to tell if the first-order
approach is valid for large n.
To side-step the first-order approach, one defines again the
‘‘upper envelope,’’ which reads in this case
ϕn(µ) = maxµ≥0 {(Gn(µ,µ)− Gn(µ,µ))∆n(µ)
+ C(µ)− C(µ)}. (26)
Then, as above, one can show that if marginal costs are logconcave,
then the optimally implemented effort µ∗n in the tournament
between n workers and the corresponding optimal effort level
µFOAn in the relaxed problem satisfy µ
∗
n ≤ µFOAn . Thus, also
in tournaments with more than two contestants, the first-order
approach, if invalid, would tend to overstate implemented effort
levels.
Additional conclusions can be obtained by focusing, as Nalebuff
and Stiglitz (1983) do, on the incentive compatibility condition at
the specific effort levelµ = 0. In the case of the normal distribution
at least, one may then characterize the limit behavior of µ∗n as
follows.
Proposition 4. Suppose that F is normal. Then, as the number
of contestants n increases above all finite bounds, the optimally
implemented effort level µ∗n goes to zero.
The result above characterizes the limit behavior of a sequence of
optimal tournaments in a setting where it is a priori not clear if the
first-order approach is applicable. It follows from the proposition
that the first-order approach is indeed invalid in large tournaments
in the case of risk-neutrality. Even though Proposition 4 holds also
under the assumption of risk-aversion, no conclusion is possible
about the validity of the first-order approach in large tournaments
for the case of risk-aversion. However, this fact only supports the
usefulness of the envelope approach because it delivers results
also in situations where sufficient conditions for the first-order
approach may be difficult to find.
7. Conclusion
It has been shown that the first-order approach, if used
exclusively, may lead to a positively biased assessment of the
efficiency of rank-order tournaments. In particular, tournaments
may not be very suitable as compensation schemes when
performance is a relatively good signal of effort. Intuitively, prize
spread and performance measurement are complements, forcing
firms to reduce the formerwhen the latter improves. In the settings
studied above, the prize structure is so unrewarding that the
avoidance of cheating becomes a binding constraint, overruling
the usual trade-off between risk and incentives. As a consequence,
individual contracts such as piece rates may dominate the optimal
tournament even when workers are risk-neutral.21
In a recent survey, Waldman (2013) finds as one of the testable
predictions of tournament theory that the prize is increasing
in the number of contestants. The results of the present paper
suggest, however, that prediction might not be robust because
with many contestants, the first-order approach need not be
valid, and the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium may lead to
inefficient levels of effort. This observation might even help to
explain the negative relationship between the salary gap between
CEO and vice president and the number of VPs (O’Reilly et al.,
1988).
Regarding further research, one issue might be the question of
whether the theoretical issues discussed in this paper may con-
stitute a practical reason for not using tournaments. For example,
Lazear and Rosen (1981, p. 848) argue that in the case of risk-
neutrality, the tie between individual contracts and tournaments
is broken by differential costs of information and measurement.
The present analysis obviously provides an alternative hypothesis.
Another interesting issue would be the extension of the present
21 With this type of observation, the present paper takes a similar line as, e.g.,
Chaigneau et al. (2014), who show that the sufficient statistics theorem fails to hold
when the first-order approach is dropped in a standard principal–agent problem.
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analysis to tournaments with more than a single winner (Krishna
and Morgan, 1998; Kalra and Shi, 2001; Budde, 2009; Akerlof and
Holden, 2012) or to various types of unbalanced tournaments (e.g.,
Meyer, 1992; Kono and Yagi, 2008; and Imhof and Kräkel, forth-
coming). Finally, it might be worthwhile to explore whether the
comparably simple approach outlined in Section 3 could be applied
to other settings in contract theory and mechanism design.22
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By Jensen’s inequality, constraint (3)
implies (U(W1) + U(W2))/2 ≤ U(µV ). Hence, from the Inada
conditions, there is a µ > 0 such that implementing any µ > µ is
strictly inferior toµ = 0. By (3) and (5), this implies that there is a
W > 0 such thatW1,W2 ∈ [−W ,W ] for any optimal tournament.
Thus, one may replace the feasible set by I = {(W1,W2, µ) ∈
[−W ,W ]2 × [0, µ]: (3), (4), and W1 ≥ W2}. But I ≠ ∅, because
(0, 0, 0) ∈ I . Moreover, I is closed as an intersection of closed
sets. 
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma A.1. Define
ψ(µ,µ) ≡ ∂
∂µ
{∆(µ)(G(µ− µ)− G(0))+ C(µ)− C(µ)} (27)
= ∆′(µ)(G(µ− µ)− G(0))−∆(µ)g(µ− µ)+ C ′(µ),
(28)
where ∆′(µ) = C ′′(µ)/g(0). Then the family {ψ(·,µ)}µ≥0 is
equidifferentiable at any µ ≥ 0.
Proof. Since g is a density with bounded first and second
derivatives,
∂2ψ(µ,µ)
∂µ2
= ∆′′′(µ)(G(µ− µ)− G(0))− 3∆′′(µ)g(µ− µ) (29)
+ 3∆′(µ)g ′(µ− µ)−∆(µ)g ′′(µ− µ)+ C ′′′(µ) (30)
exists and is bounded in µ, for any µ ≥ 0. It follows that the
family {∂ψ(·,µ)/∂µ}µ≥0 is equicontinuous at any µ ≥ 0. Using
the Mean Value Theorem, as in Milgrom and Segal (2002, p. 587),
{ψ(·,µ)}µ≥0 is now seen to be equidifferentiable at anyµ ≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote by X(µ) the set of maximizers in
problem (11). Using Lemma A.1, it follows fromMilgrom and Segal
(2002, Thms. 1&3) that ϕ is right-hand differentiable at any µ ≥ 0
with
ϕ′(µ+) ≡ lim
ε→0+
1
ε
(ϕ(µ+ ε)− ϕ(µ)) ≥ ψ(µ,µ), (31)
for anyµ ∈ X(µ).23 Moreover, as a consequence of local and global
optimality conditions,
∆(µ)g(µ− µ)− C ′(µ) ≤ 0, (32)
22 The present paper has followed Green and Stokey (1983) in assuming that
firms restrict attention to tournaments that have a symmetric pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Under this assumption, tournaments ultimately become useless as an
incentive device when monitoring becomes arbitrarily precise. Indeed, in the limit,
there does not exist any pure-strategy equilibrium for W1 > W2 (e.g., Bull et al.,
1987, fn. 3), forcing the firm to setW1 = W2 . However, allowing for randomization
would not re-establish efficiency. Also, the characterization of mixed-strategy
equilibria in tournaments with little noise seems to require different methods
(Ewerhart, 2015), and therefore lies beyond the scope of the present analysis.
23 Intuitively, the value function increases by at least as much as the value at any
given global maximum.
and
∆(µ)(G(µ− µ)− G(0))+ C(µ)− C(µ) ≥ 0, (33)
for any µ ∈ X(µ). Suppose µ > 0. Then, using inequalities (32)
and (33) to put a lower bound on (28) shows that
ϕ′(µ+) ≥ −C
′′(µ)
C ′(µ)
(C(µ)− C(µ))− C ′(µ)+ C ′(µ)
≡ φ(µ,µ) (34)
for any µ ∈ X(µ). By assumption, C ′′/C ′ is weakly decreasing.
Therefore, for anyµ ≤ µ,
C ′′(µ)
C ′(µ)
(C(µ)− C(µ)) = C ′′(µ)
C ′(µ)
 µ
µ C
′(µ)dµ (35)
≤
 µ
µ C
′(µ)C ′′(µ)
C ′(µ) dµ (36)
= C ′(µ)− C ′(µ). (37)
Hence, φ(µ,µ) ≥ 0 in this case. Using completely analogous
arguments, one shows that, similarly, φ(µ,µ) ≥ 0 ifµ > µ. Thus,
ϕ′(µ+) ≥ 0 for any µ > 0. Note also that ϕ is continuous on R+,
as a consequence of Berge’s theorem. It follows that ϕ is monotone
increasing (Royden, 1988, Sec. 5). Hence, noting that ϕ(0) = 0,
the feasible set of problem (12)–(13) is an interval [0, µ#], for
some µ# ≥ 0. But µFOA is a global optimum of U . Therefore,
µ∗ ≤ µFOA, proving the first assertion. The second assertion is now
immediate. 
For the following three lemmas, the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 3 are imposed.
Lemma A.2. U is strongly pseudoconcave in µ.
Proof. Total differentiation of Eqs. (3) and (5), and subsequently
solving the resulting system of linear equations, yields
dW1
dµ
= 2Vu
′
2 + c/g(0)
u′1 + u′2
, (38)
dW2
dµ
= 2Vu
′
1 − c/g(0)
u′1 + u′2
, (39)
where u′1 ≡ U ′(W1) and u′2 ≡ U ′(W2). Therefore,
∂U
∂µ
= 2V u
′
1u
′
2
u′1 + u′2
+ c
2g(0)
u′1 − u′2
u′1 + u′2
− cµ. (40)
Differentiating (40)with respect toµ, and assuming that ∂U/∂µ =
0, one obtains
∂2U
∂µ2
= 2V
u′1 + u′2

u′′1u
′
2
dW1
dµ
+ u′1u′′2
dW2
dµ

+ c/2g(0)
u′1 + u′2

u′′1
dW1
dµ
− u′′2
dW2
dµ

− cµ
u′1 + u′2
·

u′′1
dW1
dµ
+ u′′2
dW2
dµ

− c, (41)
where u′′1 ≡ U ′′(W1) and u′′2 ≡ U ′′(W2). Hence, using (38)–(39)
and ∂U/∂µ = 0 another time, one arrives at
∂2U
∂µ2
= (−2s) · 2V
2u′1u
′
2 + c2/4g(0)2 − c2µ2
u′1 + u′2
− c, (42)
where s = −u′′1/u′1 = −u′′2/u′2 ≥ 0. It follows that ∂2U/∂µ2 < 0
if µ ≤ 1/2g(0). Otherwise, i.e., if µ > 1/2g(0), then ∂U/∂µ = 0
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implies
2Vu′1u
′
2 = cµ(u′1 + u′2)−
c
2g(0)
(u′1 − u′2) (43)
= c

µ− 1
2g(0)

u′1 + c

µ+ 1
2g(0)

u′2 (44)
≥ cµu′2. (45)
Hence,
2Vu′1 ≥ cµ. (46)
Moreover, combining (43) with u′2 ≥ u′1, one finds 2Vu′1u′2 ≥
2cµu′1, so that
Vu′2 ≥ cµ. (47)
Multiplying the two inequalities (46) and (47), one arrives at
2V 2u′1u
′
2 ≥ c2µ2. It follows that ∂2U/∂µ2 < 0, which proves the
claim. 
Lemma A.3. µFOA > 0. Moreover, µFOA is continuous and, provided
s > 0, strictly decreasing in σ .
Proof. It is shown first that µFOA > 0. Indeed, for µ = 0, Eqs. (3)
and (5) implyW1 = W2, so that evaluating Eq. (40) atµ = 0 yields
∂U
∂µ

µ=0
= 2V u
′
1u
′
2
u′1 + u′2
> 0. (48)
Hence,µFOA > 0, as claimed. Differentiating now (40) with respect
to σ and exploiting that ∂U/∂µ = 0, one obtains
∂2U
∂µ∂σ
= 2V
u′1 + u′2

u′′1u
′
2
dW1
dσ
+ u′1u′′2
dW2
dσ

+ cσ/2g(0)
u′1 + u′2

u′′1
dW1
dσ
− u′′2
dW2
dσ

− cµ
u′1 + u′2
·

u′′1
dW1
dσ
+ u′′2
dW2
dσ

+ c
2g(0)
u′1 − u′2
u′1 + u′2
. (49)
But, from Eq. (3) and the first-order condition U(W1) − U(W2) =
cµσ
g(0) , it is immediate that
dW1
dσ
= −dW2
dσ
= cµ
g(0)(u′1 + u′2)
. (50)
Simplifying the right-hand side of (49) using (50), and using that
s > 0, one arrives at
∂2U
∂µ∂σ
= − sσ c
2µ
2g(0)2(u′1 + u′2)
− sc
2µ2(u′2 − u′1)
g(0)(u′1 + u′2)2
− c(u
′
2 − u′1)
2g(0)(u′1 + u′2)
< 0. (51)
Since U is strongly pseudoconcave with respect to µ, the claim
follows. 
Lemma A.4. µ∗(σ ) ≠ µFOA(σ ) for some σ > 0.
Proof. From incentive compatibility with respect to a deviation toµ = 0,
0 ≥ (Gσ (−µ)− Gσ (0))C
′(σ )
gσ (0)
+ C(µ)− C(0)
≥ − cσµ
g(0)
+ cµ
2
2
, (52)
where the second inequality follows from Gσ ≤ 1. Hence, µ ≤
2σ/g(0), and therefore, µ∗(σ )→ 0 as σ → 0. On the other hand,
by Lemma A.3, µFOA(σ ) does not tend to zero as σ → 0. Thus,
for σ > 0 sufficiently small, µ∗(σ ) ≠ µFOA(σ ), which proves the
lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma A.4, there is aσ > 0 such that
µ∗(σ) ≠ µFOA(σ). Hence, the envelope constraintmust be binding
in the reformulated problem associated with Gσ . Since marginal
costs are logconcave, it follows from the proof of Proposition 2 that
µ ≤ µ∗(σ) is equivalent to
(Gσ (µ− µ)− Gσ (0))C ′(µ)gσ (0) + C(µ)− C(µ) ≤ 0 (µ ≥ 0). (53)
Let σ > 0. Then, with λ ≡ σ/σ , purely algebraic manipulation
exploiting the homogeneity of the cost function shows that
(Gσ (µ− µ)− Gσ (0))C ′(µ)gσ (0) + C(µ)− C(µ)
= 1
λ2

(Gσ (µλ − µλ)− Gσ (0))C ′(µλ)gσ (0) + C(µλ)− C(µλ)

,
(54)
where µλ ≡ λµ andµλ ≡ λµ. Hence, µλ ≤ λµ∗(σ) is equivalent
to
(Gσ (µλ − µλ)− Gσ (0))C ′(µλ)gσ (0) + C(µλ)− C(µλ)
≤ 0 (µλ ≥ 0). (55)
Invoking Lemma A.2, it follows that
µ∗(σ ) = min
σσ µ∗(σ), µFOA(σ ) (56)
for any σ > 0. By Lemma A.3, there is a unique σ ∗ such that
σ ∗σ µ∗(σ) = µFOA(σ ∗). (57)
Moreover,
µ∗(σ ) = σσ µ∗(σ) = σσ ∗µFOA(σ ∗) (58)
if σ ≤ σ ∗, and µ∗(σ ) = µFOA(σ ) if σ > σ ∗. 
Proof of Remark 1. Suppose the firm intends to implement an
effort level µ. In the resulting tournament, a worker’s expected
utility from exerting an effort of µmay be written asUσ (µ|µ) = Uσ (µ)+ Gσ (µ−µ)∆σ (µ)− C(µ), (59)
where ∆σ (µ) = cµ/gσ (0), and Uσ is a function that does not
depend on µ. Note that
∂2Uσ (µ|µ)
∂µ2
= g
′
σ (µ−µ)cµ
gσ (0)
− c. (60)
Since g ′σ is continuous with g ′σ (0) = 0, this implies that there is
an open and bounded neighborhood N of µ∗(σ ) such that (60) is
strictly negative for any (µ,µ) ∈ N × N . In particular, for anyµ ∈ N , the restriction of Uσ (·|µ) to N has a unique maximum
at µ. Since N is bounded, Inada conditions imply there is some
µmax > 0 such that Uσ (µ|µ) < Uσ (µ|µ) for any µ > µmax
and for any µ ∈ N . By choosing the open set N sufficiently
small, the compact set M = [0, µmax]\N is clearly non-empty.
The restriction of U∗σ ≡ Uσ (·|µ∗(σ )) to M therefore assumes
its maximum in M, say at some µ∗(σ ). Incentive compatibility
implies U∗σ (µ∗(σ ))− U∗σ (µ∗(σ )) ≤ 0. To provoke a contradiction,
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suppose that U∗σ (µ∗(σ ))− U∗σ (µ∗(σ )) < 0. Then,Uσ (µ|µ∗(σ ))−Uσ (µ∗(σ )|µ∗(σ )) < 0 for any µ ∈ M. By Berge’s Theorem, this
implies Uσ (µ|µ) − Uσ (µ∗(σ )|µ) < 0 for any µ ∈ M, provided
that µ is sufficiently close to µ∗(σ ). Hence, such µ is incentive
compatible. But, by Lemma A.2, Uσ (µ) is strictly increasing in µ
in a neighborhood of µ∗(σ ), which is impossible. 
Proof of Remark 2. W.l.o.g., let σ < σ ∗ (the case σ = σ ∗
follows by continuity), and choose some optimal (W ∗1 (σ ),W
∗
2 (σ ),
µ∗(σ )) associated with Gσ . Then, from Remark 1, there is a µ∗(σ )
such that
(U(W ∗1 )− U(W ∗2 ))(Gσ (µ∗ − µ∗)− Gσ (0))
= c
2

(µ∗)2 − (µ∗)2

, (61)
where the argument σ has been dropped to ease notation. From
the Inada conditions, µ∗ > 0. Hence, both µ∗ and µ∗ are interior
maxima of U∗σ (·|, µ∗(σ )), satisfying
gσ (0)(U(W ∗1 )− U(W ∗2 )) = cµ∗, (62)
gσ (µ∗ − µ∗)(U(W ∗1 )− U(W ∗2 )) = cµ∗, (63)
where gσ (z) = g(z/σ)/σ . Adding (62) and (63) up, multiplying
the result throughwith (µ∗−µ∗)/2, and subsequently subtracting
(61), one arrives at
gσ (0)+ gσ (γ )
2
= Gσ (γ )− Gσ (0)
γ
, (64)
where γ = µ∗ − µ∗. Eq. (64) allows at most one strictly positive
solution γ = γ (σ ). To see this, define the function
hσ (γ ) = Gσ (γ )− Gσ (0)− gσ (0)+ gσ (γ )2 γ . (65)
Then, h′σ (0) = 0, and h′′(γ ) = −γ g ′′(γ )/2. Thus, since g is
strictly bell-shaped, there is indeed atmost one solution. Next, note
that (64) implies γ (σ ) = σ · γ (1). Finally, from the first-order
conditions, g(0)/g(γ ) = µ∗(σ )/µ∗(σ ). Simple algebra leads now
to (17). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the specific deviation toµ = 0.
For any µ ≥ 0, we have
ϕn(µ) ≥ (Gn(0, µ)− Gn(µ,µ))C
′(µ)
gn
+ C(µ)− C(0) (66)
≥ −C
′(µ)
ngn
+ C(µ)− C(0), (67)
since Gn(µ,µ) = 1n . For µ∗n to constitute an equilibrium in the
tournament between n workers, it is necessary that ϕn(µ∗n) ≤ 0.
Hence,
C(µ∗n)− C(0)
C ′(µ∗n)
≤ 1
ngn
. (68)
Because f ′(ε) = −εf (ε)/σ 2 in the case of the normal distribution,
integrating by parts yields
ngn = n
 +∞
−∞
(n− 1)F(ε)n−2f (ε)2dε (69)
= −n
 +∞
−∞
F(ε)n−1f ′(ε)dε (70)
= n
σ 2
 +∞
−∞
εF(ε)n−1f (ε)dε (71)
w
1
σ
√
2 ln n, (72)
where the asymptotic relationship for the mean extreme of n
identically and independently distributed normal variables has
been taken from David and Nagaraja (2003, Sec. 10.5). But, as in
the proof of Proposition 1, Jensen’s inequality implies
U(W1)+ (n− 1)U(W2)
n
≤ U(µV ) (73)
for any n. Hence, µ∗n ≤ µ for any n. Since ngn →∞ for n →∞, it
follows from (68) that, indeed, µ∗n → 0 for n →∞. 
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